Follow the Money

Public Money,
Private Returns.

Since 2017, governments have spent public money building a market where investors fund services and get paid back, with a return, when people hit targets written into a contract.

At the same time, the Future Fund has been investing public wealth in some of the businesses that public subsidies already pay.

Newsprint cut-out of a hand holding fifty dollar notes.
$30m

Announced by Treasurer Scott Morrison and Social Services Minister Christian Porter in August 2017 to develop a social impact investing market.[1]

$630m

The strategy the government’s own taskforce proposed in 2020, with $410 million from the Commonwealth.[2]

$100m

Labor’s Commonwealth Outcomes Fund, committed in the 2023–24 Budget.[3]

$289.7bn

Future Fund assets at 30 June 2026. That’s public wealth, invested on our behalf.[4]

Where the Money Comes From

There are five kinds of money in this story. Most of it is ours.

1

Subsidies

Public money paid to providers for care, such as the Child Care Subsidy, which is paid to providers to pass on as a fee cut.[5]

2

Public Wealth

The Future Fund. It hands billions to private managers to invest, including in companies that own care providers.[6]

3

Outcomes Money

Government payments made when targets in a contract are met, such as the $100 million Commonwealth Outcomes Fund.[3]

4

Banks and Investors

Commonwealth Bank and Westpac helped finance the Resilient Families bond. A proposed public loan would repay commercial banks first.[7][8]

5

Billionaires and Foundations

In December 2023, Andrew and Nicola Forrest’s Minderoo Foundation and the Paul Ramsay Foundation, along with Westpac and Macquarie, agreed in principle to invest alongside government and help design the $100 million Outcomes Fund.[9]

How the money moves Your taxes go to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth pays subsidies to care providers and invests public wealth through the Future Fund. The Future Fund gives money to private managers, who invest it in holding vehicles that own care providers. Providers earn subsidy income and fees from you. Profits and returns flow back up to the managers and the Future Fund. Under outcomes contracts, banks, investors and foundations fund a provider first and government repays them, with a return, when targets are met. YouTaxes and gap fees CommonwealthBudget Future Fund$289.7bn of public wealth Private managersQuadrant, Bain, EQT Holding vehiclesTrusts and partnerships Care providersChildcare, aged care, NDIS Banks, investorsand foundationsOutcomes contracts Taxes Public wealth Allocations Investments Ownership Subsidies Gap fees Upfront money Profits and returns flow back up Paid back, plus a return,when targets are met

Solid lines show money going in. Dashed lines show money coming back out. The Future Fund’s records value each manager’s whole allocation, so they don’t show how much reached any particular provider.[6]

How They Built the Market

The policy started under the Coalition and survived the change of government.

  1. 8 August 2017Morrison and Porter announce $30 million to develop social impact investing. They say linking Commonwealth and state records will help find more investment opportunities, and promise to work on removing regulatory barriers.[1]
  2. April 2019Josh Frydenberg, Paul Fletcher and Jane Hume announce $5 million for a Social Impact Investing Taskforce and $14.1 million for three trials where organisations are paid on the outcomes they achieve.[10]
  3. 2019Michael Traill chairs the taskforce. He had worked at Macquarie and Social Ventures Australia, co-founded For Purpose Investment Partners in 2018, and chairs the Paul Ramsay Foundation.[2][11]
  4. July 2020Anne Ruston signs a Commonwealth and state social impact investing agreement backed by $22.3 million. Her release says investors provide upfront capital and “the Government pays dividends only when performance targets are met”.[12]
  5. November 2020The taskforce proposes a $630 million strategy. Advice commissioned for its report describes how to help disability providers buy one another, including help with business plans, legal work and accounting for acquisitions.[2]
  6. December 2022An updated report proposes a $200 million public loan. Commercial banks would be repaid before the public lender.[8]
  7. 2023–24 BudgetLabor commits $100 million to a Commonwealth Outcomes Fund, then $5.5 million to run it.[3]
  8. December 2023At Chalmers’ investor roundtable, Westpac, Macquarie, the Minderoo Foundation and the Paul Ramsay Foundation agree in principle to invest alongside government and help co-design the Outcomes Fund.[9]
  9. November 2024Treasurer Jim Chalmers and Finance Minister Katy Gallagher change the Future Fund’s mandate to name national priorities, including housing.[13]
  10. December 2024Greystar announces a $1.6 billion student accommodation deal with the Future Fund.[14]
  11. March 2025Chalmers and Amanda Rishworth announce $1.2 million for a $4.2 million Social Enterprise Loan Fund. The Macquarie Group Foundation is one of the partners.[15]
Michael Traill chaired the government’s taskforce. He runs an investment firm working in care and chairs the Paul Ramsay Foundation, one of the foundations later invited to invest alongside government. Government should publish his interest declarations and show how it managed that overlap.

How Social Investment Pays

Investors put up the money. Government pays them back, with a return, if a target in the contract is met. In the words of the 2020 ministerial release, “the Government pays dividends only when performance targets are met”.[12]

How social impact investing pays A loop. Investors put money in. A provider runs the service. The KPI gets counted, such as staying out of hospital or a child going home. Government pays out only if targets are met. Investors get their money back plus a return. The last step, the person, is dashed: the contract stops counting after a set window, so what happens to the person afterwards is not tracked by the payment. Investors put money inBanks, foundations, fundsProvider runs itFunded upfrontThe KPI gets countedOut of hospital? Child home?Government pays outOnly if targets are metInvestors get it backPlus a returnThe personWhat happens next? ? The money goes round. The person drops off the loop.

The Bullshit KPI

The payment depends on a number someone can count. The current Commonwealth trials say what that number is.[16]

Newpin, South Australia

Children reunified and still living safely with their families 18 months after starting.

Resilient Families

Children who stay living safely with their family and are not placed in out-of-home care.

Foyer Central

Commonwealth data measures outcomes in the 12 months after a young person moves out.

Resolve, NSW

Less use of hospital and health services.[17]

Once the window closes, the contract stops counting. A lower number can mean someone is doing well. It can also mean they couldn’t get treatment, or a child’s need went unrecorded.

Who Gets What

InvestorsTheir money back plus a return. Newpin NSW investors got 10% a year over the bond. Resolve investors got 3.4% a year.[18][17]
Banks and foundationsA seat at the table. Minderoo, the Paul Ramsay Foundation, Westpac and Macquarie were invited to help design the Outcomes Fund.[9]
The intermediarySocial Ventures Australia arranged Newpin and Resolve. Minderoo and the Paul Ramsay Foundation are listed among its supporting foundations.[18][17][19]
The providerService payments set by the contract. When Resolve’s formula was amended, scheduled provider payments were cut by 10%.[20]
GovernmentA claim of savings, based on a formula the public hasn’t been shown.
The personA service, while the contract lasts. Once the counting window closes, the payment no longer depends on how they’re going.

Paid When the Numbers Move

In an outcomes contract, investors put the money up first. Government pays them back when agreed results are met. The contract decides how much of that payment is for the service and how much is the investor’s return.

Resolve funded community support for people with serious mental ill-health who had spent a lot of time in hospital. Government savings on health services decided what investors were paid.[17]

The formula originally compared participants with a matched group. In March 2022, the investor report recorded a switch, after the fact, to comparing participants with their own hospital use in the year before they joined. The Year 3 result went from minus 11 per cent to a 62.5 per cent reduction.[20]

Someone who joins after an unusually long stay in hospital may spend less time there the next year anyway. Good support can keep people out of hospital too. An evaluation has to tell the two apart.

The final evaluation reported benefits and good feedback from participants. It also found the programme had not shown better outcomes than other kinds of support.[21]

Resolve, Year 3

Reported reduction in hospital use, by method

Original method: matched comparison group
minus 11%
New method: participants’ own previous year
62.5%

Source: Resolve annual investor report, March 2022.[20]

What investors got

Annual return to Resolve investors

Target scenario
7.5%
Final return
3.4%

Source: Social Ventures Australia.[17]

Children’s Lives in the Contract

Newpin in NSW linked payments to children going home to their families.

391

Children restored to their families by the time the bond matured in 2020.[18]

61%

The restoration rate Social Ventures Australia reported.[18]

10%

Investors’ annualised return over the life of the bond.[18]

A payable result is not the same thing as a safe child. Fewer children entering care can mean family support worked. It can also mean the threshold for intervening changed, or that need went unrecorded. Evaluation has to follow what happens to children after the event that triggers payment.

Some trials failed early. The list goes back more than a decade.

To check any claim of savings, you need the payment formula, every amendment to it and the comparison data. A programme can help people without proving an investment contract was the best way to pay for it.

Some Trials Failed Early

NSW started down this road in September 2011, when Treasurer Mike Baird announced a trial of social benefit bonds for reoffending and out-of-home care.[22] Here is how some of the trials since have gone.

Ended earlyPeterborough, UK, 2010

The world’s first social impact bond, for people leaving prison. Meant to run until 2017. The Ministry of Justice ended it in April 2014 to roll out its own payment-by-results probation scheme.[23]

FailedRikers Island, US, 2012

Funded by Goldman Sachs to cut reoffending among young people in jail. It didn’t, and was discontinued in August 2015.[23][24]

Ended earlyOn TRACC, NSW, 2016

Support for people on parole. Terminated in January 2019. A review found no statistically significant difference in re-imprisonment compared with existing services.[25]

Ended earlyNewpin Queensland, 2017

Family restoration. Terminated in June 2020 after low enrolments in Cairns. Investors still got 7% a year.[26][27]

Ended earlySticking Together, NSW, 2018

Jobs for young people with high barriers to work, such as disability or mental ill-health. Terminated in December 2020. Investors lost 3% a year.[28][27]

Ended earlyTransforming Rehabilitation, UK, 2014

Privatised probation paid partly on results. The Ministry of Justice ended the contracts in 2020, ahead of schedule. Eight of the 10 companies inspected in the final year were rated inadequate.[29]

Social Ventures Australia’s own investor documents list two of its bonds as “terminated early”.[27]

The UK Tried It on Sick and Disabled People

The Work Programme paid providers when people found work. Here is what the UK’s parliament, auditor and inspectors found.

“For those claiming employment and support allowance, however, the results remain very poor: only 5.8% get work, which is way below the minimum performance levels, set at 16.5%.”

Dame Anne Begg MP, Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, House of Commons, 10 October 2013[30]

“[I]f the 30% was not good enough, the 5.8% must be a cause for shame.”

Dame Anne Begg MP, comparing the Work Programme with the earlier Pathways to Work scheme[30]

“A poorly designed scheme may create perverse incentives for providers, such as welfare-to-work providers prioritising people who are easier to help and ‘parking’ those who are harder to help.”

UK National Audit Office, June 2015[31]

“The probation model delivered by Transforming Rehabilitation is irredeemably flawed.”

Dame Glenys Stacey, Chief Inspector of Probation, 2019[29]

Work Programme, sick and disabled group

Share of the ‘Other ESA’ payment group who got a job outcome

Expected
18%
Achieved by the end
12%

Only one contract reached the minimum performance level for this group. ESA is the UK’s benefit for people too sick or disabled to work. Source: UK Department for Work and Pensions.[32]

The UK Work and Pensions Committee found the scheme was much less successful for “people with disabilities, homeless people, and those with a history of drug or alcohol abuse”.[33]

They’ve Been Collecting Data on These Kids Since 1990

The NSW Human Services Dataset holds de-identified records on every NSW resident born on or after 1 January 1990, and their family members, guardians and carers.[34] One 2020 version covered 3,379,922 children, more than 8 million records and over 135 datasets from 11 agencies, including child protection, out-of-home care, police, health, housing and schools.[35] It has also been linked with Commonwealth records through the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ national data asset, PLIDA.[36]

The records exist. We haven’t seen anything published on what they show about these children after a payment was triggered.

Read more in Your Records

Both Sides of the Counter

The Commonwealth pays towards care. Through the Future Fund, it also invests in some of the businesses that own the services.

Affinity Education runs childcare centres that families pay for with help from the Child Care Subsidy.[5] In answers to the NSW Parliament in October 2025, Affinity listed the trustee for Quadrant Private Equity No.7C among its controlling shareholders.[37]

The Commonwealth Directory lists that vehicle as a Future Fund investment holding entity, controlled by its general partner or investment manager.[38]

So the Commonwealth helps families pay for childcare, while holding an investment in the ownership structure of a chain that provides it.

Newsprint cut-out of a hand stacking gold bars.

Selected Future Fund holdings at 30 June 2026

Value in millions of dollars

Bain Capital Credit
$5,226.4m
Quadrant Private Equity
$1,414.5m
Bain Capital Partners
$1,253.3m
Macquarie Group shares
$1,140.7m
EQT Infrastructure
$663.0m
Macquarie Asset Management Real Estate
$438.6m
Palantir Technologies shares
$114.6m
Ramsay Health Care shares
$85.4m
Regis Healthcare shares
$30.0m
nib holdings shares
$11.8m
Money handed to a private manager to investShares held directly

Source: Future Fund periodic investment report, 30 June 2026.[6]

A manager’s allocation can cover many funds and businesses, so these figures don’t show how much went into any one care company. Bain owned Estia Health, but the records we’ve seen don’t show that the Future Fund’s Bain money included it. The same gap applies to EQT and Icon Group, and to KKR’s loan to Family Doctor.[39][40][41]

Our research workbook maps 201 Future Fund holding entities, including trusts, partnerships and companies. That is not 201 care companies. Some hold several investments, and some sit between other entities.[42]

Buying Income From Things You Can’t Do Without

Students’ rent now feeds an investment held partly with public wealth. In December 2024, Greystar announced a $1.6 billion student accommodation deal with the Future Fund, covering 5,662 beds. That figure is the value of the whole deal, not the Fund’s share.[14]

Housing, care, electricity networks and data centres all earn steady income from services people keep needing. Government controls parts of access, prices or subsidy in all of them.

The Fund’s returns aren’t spare Budget cash. Withdrawals are deferred until at least 2032–33.[13]

The Future Fund’s direct stakes

Share of each asset owned, 30 June 2026[6]

Perth Airport30%
CDC data centres29%
Port of Melbourne20%
Transgrid8%

What We Want Released

You paid for it. You’re entitled to see the paperwork.

  • The taskforce’s interest declarations, and how government managed the overlap with its chair’s investments.
  • Every outcomes contract payment formula, each amendment to it and the comparison data behind it.
  • The full chain from each Future Fund investment to the business it ends up in, with the amount and the Fund’s share.
  • How much income the Future Fund collects from services people already struggle to afford.

Sources

  1. Scott Morrison and Christian Porter, Developing Australia’s Social Impact Investing Market, joint ministerial announcement, 8 August 2017. The $12 million component covered priority groups and data linkages; it was not solely a data-system budget. https://formerministers.dss.gov.au/17344/developing-australias-social-impact-investing-market/
  2. Social Impact Investing Taskforce, Final report, November 2020. Supplied 504-page PDF. References in the text use printed page numbers: the main report’s printed page 1 is PDF page 9. The Inside Policy appendix has its own pagination; its printed page 2 is PDF page 423. Principal passages: pp. 1–4, 205–207 and 217–219; Inside Policy appendix pp. 2, 42 and 46–49. Proposals and commissioned analysis are distinguished from subsequent decisions. Taskforce establishment and membership are also recorded by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2023-391009 https://www.pmc.gov.au/domestic-policy/social-impact-investing-taskforce
  3. Department of Social Services, Commonwealth Outcomes Fund. Budget allocations, programme purpose, rounds and published timetable. https://www.dss.gov.au/social-impact-investing/commonwealth-outcomes-fund
  4. Future Fund, Year in Review 2025–26, annual performance. Reports $289.7 billion Future Fund assets, 14.8 per cent annual return and separate aggregate assets under management. Figures described as unaudited and subject to year-end finalisation. https://yearinreviewfy26.futurefund.gov.au/annual-performance.html
  5. Australian Government Department of Education, Child Care Subsidy. The subsidy assists eligible families with approved care and is paid to providers to pass on as a fee reduction. https://www.education.gov.au/early-childhood/child-care-subsidy
  6. Future Fund, Periodic Investment Report, reporting date 30 June 2026, Table 1. CSV downloaded and read on 5 October 2026 and checked again on 6 October. The Palantir entry is $114,610,256, rounded to $114.6 million. Values rounded to one decimal million; holdings are point-in-time fair values, not payments to the named companies. The direct infrastructure section reports ownership percentages. https://content.futurefund.gov.au/Periodic+Investment+Report+30+Jun+2026+-+Future+Fund+(A1435346).csv
  7. NSW Government, The Benevolent Society Social Benefit Bond. Programme records identify Commonwealth Bank and Westpac participation in the Resilient Families financing. https://www.data.nsw.gov.au/data/dataset/3-14929-the-benevolent-society-social-benefit-bond
  8. Social Impact Investing Taskforce, Updated report, December 2022. Supplied 17-page PDF. Printed page 1 is PDF page 2. Principal passages: pp. 1–3 and 6–15. Philanthropic support, bank discussions and forecast additional investment were not described as executed commitments. https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2023-391009
  9. Jim Chalmers, Investor roundtable to help modernise the economy and maximise our advantages, media release, 5 December 2023. https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/jim-chalmers-2022/media-releases/investor-roundtable-help-modernise-economy-maximise-advantages
  10. Paul Fletcher, Josh Frydenberg and Jane Hume, Morrison Government establishes Social Impact Investing Taskforce, 2019–20 Budget. https://formerministers.dss.gov.au/18766/morrison-government-establishes-social-impact-investing-taskforce/
  11. For Purpose Investment Partners, Team and Partners, Michael Traill biography. Current role and the manager’s published account of his investment career. https://www.fpinvest.com.au/team-partners
  12. Anne Ruston, States and territories sign onto social impact investing agreement, July 2020. https://formerministers.dss.gov.au/19317/states-and-territories-sign-onto-social-impact-investing-agreement/
  13. Jim Chalmers and Katy Gallagher, Future of the Future Fund, 21 November 2024. Mandate, national priorities, continuing investment responsibilities and drawdown deferral. https://ministers.finance.gov.au/financeminister/media-release/2024/11/21/future-future-fund
  14. Future Fund, Year in Review 2024–25; Greystar, student accommodation acquisition announcement, 16 December 2024. The A$1.6 billion is the acquisition’s stated value, not solely the Future Fund’s contribution. https://content.futurefund.gov.au/2024-25%20Future%20Fund%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf https://www.greystar.com/business/about-greystar/newsroom/greystar-secures-landmark-a1-6-billion-pbsa-acquisition-in-australia
  15. Amanda Rishworth and Jim Chalmers, Partnering with investors to create jobs for disadvantaged Australians, 11 March 2025. $1.2 million Commonwealth contribution to the $4.2 million Social Enterprise Loan Fund, partners and lending limit. https://ministers.dss.gov.au/media-releases/17891
  16. Department of Social Services, State and Territory Partnership Trials. Outcome measures and use of Commonwealth data for Newpin, Resilient Families and Foyer Central. https://www.dss.gov.au/social-impact-investing/state-and-territory-partnership-trials
  17. Social Ventures Australia, Resolve Social Benefit Bond. Current programme summary, contractual outline and reported final investor return of 3.4% a year, compared with a 7.5% target scenario. https://www.socialventures.org.au/our-impact/resolve-social-benefit-bond/
  18. Social Ventures Australia, Newpin NSW maturity announcement, 1 October 2020. Issuer reports 391 restorations, a 61% restoration rate and a 10% annualised investor return over the bond term. https://www.socialventures.org.au/our-impact/strong-positive-outcomes-delivered-for-families-and-investors-on-maturity-of-australias-first-social-impact-bond/
  19. Social Ventures Australia, Annual Review 2025. Lists Minderoo Foundation and Paul Ramsay Foundation among charitable foundation supporters, p. 4. https://www.socialventures.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/SVA_Annual-Review_FA_1-12-25.pdf
  20. Social Ventures Australia, Resolve SBB Annual Investor Report, issued March 2022 for the period ending September 2021, pp. 3 and 12–13. Records retrospective replacement of the matched comparison group, the restated Year 3 percentage and accompanying changes to the financial formula and service payments. https://www.socialventures.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Resolve-SBB-Annual-Investor-Report-2022.pdf
  21. Urbis for Social Ventures Australia, Evaluation of the Resolve Program, Final Evaluation Report, published through NSW Government in 2025. Executive summary, limitations and conclusion, especially PDF pp. 6–8, 14 and 38. The PDF’s web title is inconsistent with its internal Resolve report title; citation follows the internal document. https://www.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/noindex/2025-10/esa31417-resolve-evaluation-final-report_vshare.pdf
  22. NSW Parliamentary Research Service, Social impact bonds, e-brief. Treasurer Mike Baird announced a trial of social benefit bonds in September 2011; request for proposals released 30 September 2011. https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/social-impact-bonds/e-briefsocial%20impact%20bonds.pdf
  23. NSW Parliamentary Research Service, Social impact bonds and recidivism. Peterborough and Rikers Island bonds. https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/Social%20Impact%20Bonds%20and%20Recidivism.pdf
  24. Vera Institute of Justice, Impact Evaluation of the Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience Program at Rikers Island, September 2016. Independent evaluation and August 2015 termination. The project was the first US social impact bond. https://www.vera.org/publications/rikers-adolescent-behavioral-learning-experience-evaluation
  25. NSW Government, Office of Social Impact Investment, On TRACC. https://www.nsw.gov.au/departments-and-agencies/osii/social-impact-investments/on-tracc
  26. Social Ventures Australia, Newpin Queensland Social Benefit Bond. Issuer’s account of early termination in June 2020, enrolment issues and the policy emphasis on Aboriginal community-controlled delivery. https://www.socialventures.org.au/our-impact/newpin-queensland-social-benefit-bond/
  27. Social Ventures Australia, Arc Social Impact Bond Information Memorandum. Track record table lists Newpin Qld (terminated early, 7% pa) and Sticking Together (terminated early, -3% pa). https://www.socialventures.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Arc-Social-Impact-Bond-Information-Memorandum-Updated.pdf
  28. Social Ventures Australia, Sticking Together Social Impact Bond. https://www.socialventures.org.au/our-impact/sticking-together-social-impact-bond/
  29. Civil Service World, Part-privatisation of probation “irredeemably flawed”, reporting HM Chief Inspector of Probation Dame Glenys Stacey, 2019. https://www.civilserviceworld.com/professions/article/partprivatisation-of-probation-irredeemably-flawed
  30. UK House of Commons Hansard, Work Programme debate, 10 October 2013. https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2013-10-10/debates/13101057000002/WorkProgramme
  31. UK National Audit Office, Outcome-based payment schemes: government’s use of payment by results, summary, 19 June 2015. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Outcome-based-payment-schemes-governments-use-of-payment-by-results-Summary.pdf
  32. UK Department for Work and Pensions, Work Programme statistical summary, data to June 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/work-programme-statistical-summary-data-to-june-2020/work-programme-statistical-summary-data-to-june-2020
  33. UK Work and Pensions Committee, Can the Work Programme work for all user groups?, committee news release, 2013. https://committees.parliament.uk/work/5376/work-programme-the-experience-of-different-user-groups/news/181015/mps-say-government-employment-scheme-not-reaching-the-most-disadvantaged/
  34. NSW Department of Communities and Justice, Human Services Dataset, frequently asked questions. https://ageingdisabilitycommission.nsw.gov.au/content/dcj/dcj-website/dcj/about-us/facsiar/human-services-dataset-hsds/frequently-asked-questions.html
  35. ANROWS, Linked data on NSW child protection, domestic and family violence, alcohol and other drugs, and mental health, 2025. https://www.anrows.org.au/publication/linked-data-nsw-child-protection-dfv-aod-mental-health/read/
  36. Australian Bureau of Statistics, PLIDA data and legislation. Lists NSW Human Services Dataset, 1990 to 2020, among once-off linkages. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/data-integration/integrated-data/person-level-integrated-data-asset-plida/plida-data-and-legislation
  37. Affinity Education Group, answers to supplementary questions, NSW Legislative Council, received 22 October 2025, question 15, p. 4. Lists the Quadrant trustees and funds described as controlling shareholders. https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/22593/1a.%20ASQ%20-%20Affinity%20-%20received%2022%20October%202025.PDF
  38. Commonwealth Directory, Quadrant Private Equity No.7C. Describes a Future Fund investment holding entity controlled by the general partner or investment manager. Directory entry updated 26 June 2024. https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/finance/future-fund-management-agency/future-fund-board-guardians/quadrant-private-equity-no7c
  39. Bain Capital, Bain Capital to Exit Estia Health, 26 May 2026. Reports December 2023 acquisition, growth from 73 to 93 homes and an agreement to sell to Stonepeak. Expected completion in late 2026 remained subject to regulatory approvals in this announcement; completion is not asserted here. https://www.baincapital.com/news/bain-capital-exit-estia-health
  40. EQT, acquisition agreement for Icon Group by EQT Infrastructure V, 19 November 2021. Describes retained minority investment by Goldman Sachs Asset Management and reinvestment by doctors. Does not identify the Future Fund as an investor in Infrastructure V. https://eqtgroup.com/news/eqt-infrastructure-to-acquire-icon-group-australias-largest-integrated-cancer-care-provider-2021-11-19
  41. KKR, financing for Family Doctor, announcement distributed by Business Wire, 2 March 2025. A$186 million financing from KKR’s Asia Pacific Credit strategy. A financing transaction does not establish an equity acquisition or Future Fund participation in the loan. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250302805504/en/KKR-Provides-Bespoke-Financing-Solution-to-Australian-GP-Group-Family-Doctor
  42. Supplied research workbook, Future Fund Board of Guardians: 201 holding entities. Used as an entity map, not as proof of investment in every company a named manager owns.